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Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
619 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (Miccosukee I)
and
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States,
619 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2010) (Miccosukee II).
Jesse Froehling
ABSTRACT
In Miccosukee I, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers wanted to build a bridge along the
Tamiani Trail that would, in effect, flood part of the reservations of the Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Florida. The Tribe sued the Corps alleging that the construction of the bridge would
violate the National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
The court concluded that a ―notwithstanding‖ clause in a Congressional appropriations act
overrode environmental procedural laws. After Miccosukee I, the tribe sued the U.S. Department
of Transportation, alleging procedural violations in the construction of the bridge. Once again,
the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, because a
similar ―notwithstanding‖ clause deprived the court of the discretion to curb Congress‘ intent.
I. INTRODUCTION
After a highway through the Florida Everglades proved detrimental to the surrounding
environment, Congress required the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to build a mile-long
bridge to improve water flow through an integral part of the Everglades.398 In Miccosukee I, the
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida (the Tribe) filed suit against the Corps alleging violation
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of numerous environmental procedural statutes.399 The Tribe worried, in essence, that
construction of the bridge would allow the Everglades to flood its reservations.400 The Eleventh
Circuit held that a general repealing clause in the language of the Omnibus Act of 2009 deprived
the court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.401 In Miccosukee II, decided the same
day, the Tribe alleged the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) violated transportation
procedural statutes.402 Following the same reasoning it outlined in Miccosukee I, the court again
held that the Omnibus Act deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
II. MICCOSUKEE I
A. Historical Background
The Miccosukee Tribe‘s ancestors may have arrived in the southeastern United States
about 10,000 years ago403 – 5,000 years before geological shifts formed the Everglades.404 In
1962, Congress officially recognized the Tribe, and today, tribal members live on several
reservations scattered throughout the vast Floridian swamp, which covers much of the state south
of Orlando.405
Historically, water flowed from the Kissimmee River to Lake Okeechobee, then
southwest to Florida Bay.406 Between the lake and the bay, the land slopes just three inches per
mile, creating a thirty-mile wide river gradually flowing south, though in bad weather the flow is
quite noticeable.407 In 1928, the river breached the Okeechobee levy and drowned more than
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2,000 farm workers.408 Twenty years later, Congress passed the Flood Control Act, which
authorized the control of flooding in the Everglades.409
The Tamiami Trail (the Trail) was the first highway to cross the Everglades.410 Though
Interstate 75 to the north now carries more vehicles than the Trail, the Trail remains a vital road
and hurricane evacuation route.411 A portion of the Trail runs along the northern boundary of
Everglades National Park; it dams water, restricting water flow into the Park and into the Shark
River Slough, the main water corridor of the Everglades.412 The restricted water flow posed a
significant environmental threat, causing ―vast losses‖ of wading birds, fish, and native plants.413
B. Procedural Background
Congress responded to environmental obligations in 1989 with the Everglades National
Park Protection and Expansion Act414 and again in 2000 with the Water Resources Development
Act.415 In 2008, the Corps concluded that the most ―effective and economical‖ option for
improving water flow was to replace a piece of the Trail with a bridge.416 The same month the
Corps issued its conclusion, the Tribe sued the Corps alleging violations of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),417 the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),418 and the
Water Resources Development Act (WRDA).419 The lawsuit alleged that the Corps failed to
adhere to environmental laws during the planning phase, failed to prepare adequate
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environmental impact statements, and that the increased water levels would flood tribal lands.420
The Tribe sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)421 and
requested an injunction to halt construction of the bridge.422
In September 2008, Congress passed an appropriations act containing a section that
required the Corps to immediately implement the bridge option.423 A month later, the Tribe filed
a second lawsuit against the Corps and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) alleging
violations of the Endangered Species Act.424 The Tribe alleged that the FWS‘s biological
opinion did not adequately address the threat to the endangered snail kite and wood stork
species.425 Like in the prior NEPA case, the Tribe sought an injunction blocking the construction
of the bridge.426 Meanwhile, the Corps moved to dismiss the NEPA case, citing the 2008
Appropriations Act that required it to begin construction immediately.427 The court sided with
the Tribe and held the Act lacked the specificity required to exempt the Corps from NEPA.428
Shortly thereafter, the court issued the Tribe‘s requested injunction.429
In March 2009, Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, which included
essentially the same language as its predecessor, but added the clause, ―notwithstanding any
other provisions of law.‖430 The clause proved to be the language on which the court made its
decision; when the Corps filed a motion to dismiss, the court granted it, holding that the
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Omnibus Act was an ―explicit exemption‖ from NEPA and FACA.431 The Corps filed a copy of
the judgment with the court evaluating the Tribe‘s ESA allegations, and that court, using the
same reasoning, also dismissed the Tribe‘s claim.432 The Tribe appealed the following day.433
C. Analysis
The court sought to determine ―whether the Omnibus Act modifie[d] NEPA, FACA, and
ESA for purposes of the Tribe‘s lawsuits and thereby deprived federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the Tribe‘s claims.‖434 Appropriations acts, the court stated, may effectively
repeal older statutes through explicit repeals, general repealing clauses, and implied repeals.435
An explicit repeal identifies outright the statute it is repealing.436 In the absence of an explicit
repeal, a general repealing clause, such as ―notwithstanding any other federal law,‖ may be
sufficient.437 Lastly, an implied repeal focuses on Congressional intent; while the new statute
does not identify the statute being repealed, the Legislature‘s intent to repeal may be inferred
where a new statute conflicts with an earlier statute.438
The Tribe argued the Omnibus Act was neither an explicit repeal, because Congress failed to
articulate any statute it was repealing, nor an implied repeal, because the Corps failed to
demonstrate the necessary Congressional intent.439 The Corps countered that the
―notwithstanding‖ clause plainly indicated Congress‘ intent to override preexisting
environmental statutes.440 The court held that the ―notwithstanding‖ clause was a general
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repealing clause that overrode the controlling environmental statutes upon which the Tribe had
rested its claims.441
Firstly, the phrase ―shall . . . construct or cause to be constructed‖ in the notwithstanding
clause spoke directly to any law regulating construction of the bridge.442 Secondly, the Omnibus
Act contained an immediacy clause — ―immediately and without further delay‖— which
indicated Congress wanted the bridge built instantly.443 Lastly, the word ―shall,‖ directing that
―the Corps shall build the bridge,‖ denied the Corps any discretion in the matter.444 Reasoning
that procedural statutes do not apply when an agency lacks discretion to act, the court concluded
Congress‘ command to build the bridge precluded the applicability of NEPA, FACA, and the
ESA.445 The court also found that by mandating the bridge‘s construction, Congress transformed
an administrative decision into a legislative decision, barring the Tribe from seeking judicial
review of the agency action.446 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court and held the
Omnibus Act deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case.447
III. MICCOSUKEE II
A. Procedural Background
After the Tribe lost Miccosukee I, it brought a separate action, alleging in Counts I and II
that the DOT violated its statutory procedures and the APA.448 Specifically, the Tribe alleged
that the DOT failed to conduct a mandatory review of the bridge‘s impact on federal parkland
before transferring a Highway Easement Deed to the Florida Department of Transportation as
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required by Section 4(f) of the relevant DOT‘s statutory procedures.449 The Tribe also alleged in
Count III that in making the transfer, the DOT exceeded its statutory authority to use federal land
―reasonably necessary for the right-of-way of any highway,‖ because the Highway Easement
Deed was not for highway purposes.450 Lastly, the Tribe alleged in Count IV that the transfer of
the Highway Easement Deed violated the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion
Act because it reduced the acreage of the park and violated the Tribe‘s substantive due process
rights to use the land where the bridge would be constructed.451 Again, the Tribe sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to halt construction.452
The district court dismissed the Tribe‘s procedural claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and held that the bridge‘s construction did not violate the Tribe‘s due process rights
or the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act.453 Once again, the Tribe
appealed.454
B. Analysis
The court returned to the ―notwithstanding‖ clause it relied upon in Miccosukee I to
dismiss the Tribe‘s claims against the DOT.455 Reasoning the verb ―construct‖ is, if anything,
even closer than the connection with laws regulating the environmental implications of agency
action, the court held the Omnibus Act‘s ―notwithstanding‖ clause deprived the DOT of
discretion and the court of subject matter jurisdiction.456 Specifically, the court determined:
This repeal precludes any possibility that a federal court may entertain an action
seeking to delay or review that project, whether that review occurs under the laws
governing the U.S. DOT, the APA, or other statutory authority. The delay
449
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inherent in any review of administrative action poses a direct conflict to
Congress‘ clear statutory command that the Corps build the bridge ‗immediately
and without further delay.‘457
This conclusion compelled the court to hold that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
regarding the Tribe‘s allegations of procedural violations under Counts I and II. 458 Likewise, the
court required the district court to dismiss Counts III and IV for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.459 Regarding the alleged substantive due process violation, the court held that the
Tribe ―failed to sufficiently plead deprivation of any non-statutory right in a way that would
invoke the jurisdiction of the district court,‖ and therefore it did not have jurisdiction.460
IV. CONCLUSION
Miccosukee I and II present an ironic dichotomy. Elevating the Omnibus Act above
agency-based environmental regulation may likely preserve the Tribe‘s age-old aboriginal
environment at the expense of flooding its reservations. Regardless of the Tribe‘s plight, perhaps
the most troubling aspect of this case is the holding that Congress may override environmental
mainstays such as NEPA and the ESA with a simple clause inserted deep in the pages of an
appropriations bill. However, the court‘s reasoning is sound because precedent clearly indicates
that Congress may, and in fact did, place the necessity of the bridge above its negative
environmental impact. Congress may not interfere with judicial proceedings, but the
consequences of the Omnibus Act prohibited the tribe‘s appeal from going forward. And if that
is to change, it must fall to Congress, once again, to craft a law that provides the Tribe with
subject matter jurisdiction to bring its appeal.
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